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N O T E
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDINGS: APPREHENSION TO DISPOSITION*
I n t r o d u c t io n
While all agencies connected with the detention and treatment of 
juveniles in the District of Columbia issue annual reports which are 
available to the public, indications are that a widespread unawareness 
exists in both bar and judiciary as to the nature, purpose and effectiveness 
of the socio-legal system governing the disposition of the District’s 
juvenile offenders. Since a concern for this system is a logical incident of 
any sensitivity toward the future order and tranquillity of society, the 
purpose of this note is essentially informational, to familiarize lawyers 
with the procedures and practices employed by the District of Columbia 
and United States Governments from the time a youth is apprehended 
by police until he is either returned on probation to his home or com­
mitted to a juvenile training school, in either contingency by the Juvenile 
Court of the District of Columbia acting pursuant to the provisions of 
the Juvenile Court Act.1
The thread of analysis follows only those police and Juvenile Court 
operations having to do with juvenile deliction, by which is meant actual 
violation of the law by a youth below the age of eighteen. In its broadest 
application in this jurisdiction, the term “juvenile delinquency” includes 
truancy, conduct habitually beyond the control of parents, association 
with vagrant, vicious, or immoral persons, or deportment such “as to in­
jure or endanger the health and safety of others55;2 but as these conditions 
do not partake of the classically criminal characteristics of delinquency, 
they will not be discussed. Neither is the court’s additional jurisdiction 
over dependency, paternity, and adult criminal cases treated.3 Similarly
* The Georgetown Law Journal wishes to acknowledge the indispensable assistance of 
numerous Juvenile Court, Metropolitan Police Department and Department of Public 
Welfare officials without whose informal and spirited cooperation this effort to present an 
abbreviated but accurate account of the District of Columbia juvenile system would not 
have been possible.
1 52 Stat. 596 (1938), as amended, D.C. Code Ann. §§ 11-901, -42 (1951), as amended, 
D.C. Code Ann. §§ 11-901, -42 (Supp. VIII, 1960).
2 52 Stat. 596 (1938), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-906 (1951).
3 52 Stat. 596 (1938), as amended, 54 Stat. 735 (1940), D.C. Code Ann. §§ 11-906, -07 
(1951).
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omitted is any description of the institutions and methods of treatment 
involved once a case has been passed upon by the Juvenile Court judge, 
with the single significant exception of the post-disposition power of the 
Attorney General of the United States to transfer inmates of the National 
Training School for Boys to federal prisons for adult criminals. A resume 
of the limited case law which has reviewed District juvenile proceedings 
is integrated with the general discussion.
A brief insight into the rationale supporting the juvenile system will 
be of assistance at the outset. The philosophy underlying the procedure 
in cases involving a juvenile accused of committing an act, which if 
committed by an adult would amount to a crime, is that the delinquent 
child is to be “considered and treated not as a criminal, but as a person 
requiring care, education and protection.”4 Since rehabilitation rather 
than punishment is the end to be obtained, the proceedings by which the 
child is found to be in need of and subjected to such “care, education and 
protection” are characterized as civil in nature. And since the proceedings 
are civil in nature it follows that the constitutional safeguards for those 
accused of crime and the rules of procedure and evidence employed in 
criminal trials are not applicable. The extent to which the authorities are 
able to implement this informal design is implicitly incorporated in the 
descriptive study that follows.
I
T h e  P o lic e  a n d  J u v e n il e s
The formal processing of a delinquent which may eventually receive 
courtroom review usually begins in an arrest or, as it is carefully termed, 
“apprehension” by a police officer somewhere in the District of Columbia. 
The juvenile is taken to a precinct headquarters where, once his age is 
determined to be below eighteen, a call is placed for the Youth Aid 
Division of the Metropolitan Police Department. Youth Aid dispatches a 
Juvenile Squad car to the precinct, and with the meeting of juvenile and 
Juvenile Squad officers, a theoretical separation from conventional adult 
criminal procedures occurs.
The Youth Aid Division was formed in 19555 as a special police arm 
designed to cope with the unique status of juvenile offenders and the 
special problems posed in their handling under District of Columbia law. 
Members of the Division are normally not selected for juvenile duty
4 Thomas v. United States, 74 App. D.C. 167, 170, 121 F.2d 90S, 908 (1941).
5 Gen. Order No. 1, D.C. Metropolitan Police Dep’t (Jan. 1, 19S6).
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unless they possess five years of police experience. The approximately 
85 staff members, including 30 women, are given a 48-hour course in 
juvenile procedures upon entering the Division. The Division’s purpose, 
briefly stated, is to prevent and combat juvenile delinquency from a 
central organization by methods divorced from ordinary police techniques 
and oriented generally to the principle of juvenile rehabilitation which 
presumably motivates the actions of all agencies and government officials 
concerned with youthful offenders in the District of Columbia. In order 
to expedite the contact between Youth Aid and wayward juveniles 
apprehended for delinquency, the Division maintains patrol cars on the 
city streets 24 hours a day. Thus it is that within a brief space of time 
following apprehension the boy or girl is in the hands of special officers.
Their first step is to notify parents or relatives. Police experience 
has been that in more cases than not, parents do not bother to appear 
at the station house. The officers commence investigation by interroga­
tion, the thrust of all preliminary efforts being primarily to avoid any 
booking. Under the statute, juveniles cannot be considered criminals;6 
it follows that all records of a criminal nature, including names in a 
precinct’s arrest records, are undesirable, and Division operations attempt 
to bypass that eventuality by weighing the evidence before entering a 
charge.
The investigators use the precinct as field headquarters, however, and 
the delinquent will be kept there during the inquiry. Precinct detention 
is frequently extended for a matter of hours while police search for 
other juveniles implicated by the youth arrested. Such implication is 
commonplace since juveniles have a proclivity for finding trouble 
collectively. But while the first youth apprehended may be forced to wait, 
he waits in an open reception area of the precinct or in a side office, and 
absent a violent attitude, is not locked behind bars in violation of 
the statute.7
When sufficient evidence appears to make detention of the boy neces­
sary, i.e., when the Youth Aid officers determine probable cause, he is 
booked8 and committed to the Receiving Home for Children at 1000
« 52 Stat. 600 (1938), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-915 (1951); Pee v. United States, 107 
U.S. App. D.C. 47, 49-50, 274 F.2d 556, 558-59 (1959); Thomas v. United States, 74 
App. D.C. 167, 170, 121 F.2d 905, 908 (1941).
i  52 Stat. 602 (1938), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-927 (1951).
8 The practice of placing juvenile arrests on the Records-of-Arrest book in the precincts 
was discontinued in 1956, in keeping with the concept that juveniles shall have no criminal 
record. However, Police Form 255 (Record of Arrest) is made out in quadruplicate, three
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Mt. Olivet Road, N.E.° Alternatively, in cases of minor offenses of a 
nonviolent nature, the boy may be released in the custody of his parents 
unless such a course is, in the words of the statute, “impracticable.”10 
This latter determination is left to the discretion of the police, who use 
the nature of the offense as a principal criterion. Release involves a 
signed statement by the parent that he or she agrees to produce the 
juvenile in court. Frequently parental indifference compels the police to 
transport the youth home from the station house.
Rare cases occur when a complaint filed by a citizen together with the 
existence of evidence tending to show guilt will require that police arrest 
a juvenile sometime after an offense has been committed. No warrant is 
needed for Youth Aid officers to make such an arrest since, as noted, no 
juvenile is charged with a crime.11 Arrest itself is a concept technically 
alien to juvenile processing. Instead, juveniles are “apprehended”; but 
while there is this studied distinction made, a difference is hard to per­
ceive.12 The police do, however, obtain warrants of search when the in­
vestigation requires intrusion into a private home, obviously because 
adult rights then hang in the balance and the license of informality in 
the handling of juveniles no longer obtains.
The large majority of cases, however, involve apprehension at or near 
the scene of the offense, and the juvenile is removed to the Receiving 
Home when a release to parents is not arranged. Commitment to the 
Home is attended by none of the formal rites usually found in criminal 
arrests and detention. No notice of right to counsel is made; there is no 
available procedure for preliminary hearing before a committing magis­
trate; no bail is set.13 These omissions may be ascribed to the fact that
copies of which form a permanent part of precinct and Youth Aid Division records. No 
person outside of the police may have access to these records. Gen. Order No. 1, D.C. 
Metropolitan Police Dep’t, p. 6 (Jan. 1, 1956).
9 The police order governing commitment to the Receiving Home by Juvenile Squad 
officers reads in part: “Juveniles shall not be sent to the Receiving Home except as 
follows: (1) When they are charged with offenses which require a period of investigation; 
. . .” Gen. Order No. 1, Metropolitan Police Dep’t, p. 6 (Jan. 1, 1956).
10 52 Stat. 598 (1938), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-912 (1951).
11 52 Stat. 600 (1938), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-915(3) (1951).
12 Under the law of the District of Columbia, a restriction of the person’s full liberty 
or a brief detention in custody constitutes an “arrest.” Morton v. United States, 79 U.S. 
App. D.C. 329, 331, 147 F.2d 28, 30, cert, denied, 324 U.S. 875 (1945); Long v. Ansell, 
63 App. D.C. 68, 71, 69 F.2d 386, 389, aff’d, 293 U.S. 76 (1934).
13 The absence of a right to bail for juveniles in the District of Columbia may have been 
cured by Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 4S3 (D.D.C. 1960), appeal docketed, No. 
16037, D.C. Cir., Oct. 18, 1960.
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constitutional guarantees have not unequivocally been assumed to apply 
to juveniles, and particularly not criminal constitutional guarantees. But 
compensations of a minimal nature appear to offset reduced protections 
for juveniles in the District of Columbia. Pursuing a discretionary policy, 
Youth Aid transports juveniles in unmarked squad cars, driven by plain­
clothes policemen, thereby avoiding the stigma of the “paddy wagon”; 
in general they do not fingerprint or photograph, except where the nature 
of the offense is such as to indicate the probable future appearance of the 
offender in police hallways, in which case such records would prove helpful 
to law enforcement. Aside from these measures, and an admitted air of 
stern affability marking members of the Juvenile Squad, the juvenile 
finds himself deposited with no uncertainty in the Receiving Home, a 
detention facility which will be discussed subsequently.
The period between apprehension and commitment is ordinarily of 
short duration, usually not exceeding two or three hours. In instances 
where a search for other juveniles implicated by the one picked up 
causes delay, the pre-commitment detention may extend to five or six 
hours, but Youth Aid Division officials express a desire to avoid these 
cases even though the Mallory rule,14 which precludes the admission 
of evidence obtained during periods of illegal detention, is inapplicable 
in subsequent Juvenile Court proceedings.15 Abuses laid to police free­
dom from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in the handling of 
juveniles16 are not readily apparent and have obtained almost no appel­
late review, but conversational contacts with non-police sources disclose 
some skepticism as to whether certain policemen comprehend the special 
status of juveniles and the ostensibly rehabilitative system to which 
they are absorbed upon apprehension. Such doubts may or may not be 
justified, but in the absence of any more definitive demonstration that 
abuses do exist, the Youth Aid operation must generally be admired as 
a realistic and helpful police approach to the growing problem of juve­
nile delinquency. The understanding and readiness to assist existing 
in higher police echelons, which the Division’s organization and at­
tempted operation reflect, are most creditable and should enlist the com­
munity’s attention and applause.
A police complaint and notice of commitment are filed at the Juvenile 
Court soon after placement of the child in the Receiving Home. If the 
commitment occurs during the night, filing and notice are made when the
14 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
See Pee v. United States, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 47, 51-52, 274 F.2d 556, 560-61 (1959).
16 Id. at 50, 274 F.2d at 559.
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court opens the following morning. With the filing, police control over 
the juvenile ends, and further police participation in the case will be re­
stricted to informal consultation with court officials as to the feasibility 
of waiving jurisdiction to an adult court17 or to testifying in Juvenile 
Court if the case is retained.18
However, in cases where the police apprehend a juvenile and release 
him to his parents, participation in the case may be only beginning. It 
is only at this juncture of police juvenile processing that serious question 
can be raised as to the legal propriety of a standard police practice—the 
retention of jurisdiction over minor offenses, such as initial misdemean­
ors, which are then disposed of by a police hearing. The Juvenile Court 
never obtains notice or jurisdiction in such cases and is not empowered 
to review the police decision since no police hearing was ever contem­
plated under the statute. With regard to police involvement in juvenile 
proceedings, the statute provides in part: “In every such case [where 
police apprehend a juvenile] the officer taking the child into custody 
shall immediately report the fact to the court and the case shall then be 
proceeded with as provided in this Act.”10 Elsewhere in the act, original 
and exclusive jurisdiction in all proceedings concerning children who 
have violated the law is lodged in the Juvenile Court.20 Nevertheless, 
police screening procedures via closed hearings abound, and days after 
a juvenile has been arrested or ticketed and released he may be asked 
to return to the Youth Aid Division to explain his difficulty.21
The notice sent to the juvenile’s parents announcing these hearings is 
carefully worded: “You are hereby requested to be present . . im­
plicit in this language is Youth Aid’s awareness that a parent or child 
cannot legally be compelled to attend. Non-attendance elicits second 
and third notices from the division and occasionally a phone call. The 
effectiveness of these methods is demonstrated by the fact that police 
officers interviewed could not remember a single case in the last five
17 52 stat. 599 (1938), as amended, 61 Stat. 92 (1947), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-914 (1951).
18 Additionally, police officers occasionally visit the Receiving Home to question an 
inmate in connection with an investigation of the alleged offense.
19 52 Stat. 599 (1938), as amended, 66 Stat. 134 (19S2), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-912 
(Supp. VIH, 1960).
20 52 Stat. 597 (1938), as amended, 54 Stat. 73S (1940), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-907 
(1951).
21 It is to be observed that on the national scale, police hearings of this nature enjoy 
the recommendation of both the United States Children’s Bureau and the National Council 
of Juvenile Court Judges.
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years in which parent and child did not eventually appear at head­
quarters.
Last year 5239 hearings were held, resulting in 1295 dismissals and 
221 references to Juvenile Court. Approximately 1100 of the cases 
screened involved traffic violations which are considered delinquent 
acts in this jurisdiction.22 The remainder usually fall within the non- 
serious, nonviolent misdemeanor category.
Despite their lack of statutory authority, if one observes a few of 
these hearings and attempts to evaluate them in light of the Juvenile 
Court’s huge backlog of cases, their merit, not merely to the court but 
also to the child, becomes strikingly apparent. The hearings commenced 
in 1955 in response to a staggering workload then borne by the court 
and were expressly permitted by incumbent Judge Edith Cockrill. Her 
single stipulation was that no child screened should be placed under 
police probation; cases meriting such supervision were to be disposed of 
exclusively by the Juvenile Court. With a few exceptions, the police 
appear to have strictly observed this caveat, and those exceptions are 
cases in which the hearing officer acting completely unofficially has the 
juvenile return once or twice to report on progress. This practice is rare 
and always either ratified or requested by the parent, who is informed of 
the tenuous legal nature of the arrangement.
The hearing itself is informal and carried on in a small office off the 
main room of Youth Aid headquarters in the Municipal Center. The com­
plaint filed by the arresting officer is read to the boy and his parents, 
and he is asked whether he committed the offense. If he denies and ex­
presses a willingness to try the case, it is immediately referred to the 
court and the hearing ends. If he admits, as is the usual case, and his 
record is fair or excellent, he is given an old-fashioned horse-sense lec­
ture by the officer on (1) the penalty theoretically assessable for the 
particular act committed; (2) the utter stupidity of a young man em­
broiling himself in the particular form of trouble; (3) the jeopardy in 
which the boy places himself by his act with regard to college entrance, 
employment opportunities, and a bright future generally; and (4) the 
enormous recidivistic rate among adults with juvenile records.23 The 
hearing officers24 are characterized by what may be best described as a 
verbal surefootedness and a hard-hitting if understanding style of pres­
entation; a boy teetering on the brink of a delinquent attitude could
22 1959-6O Annual Report, Youth Aid Division, D.C. Metropolitan Police Dep’t (1960).
23 Unofficial police sources estimate this rate as high as 75%.
21 Currently there are four hearing officers, all of Detective rank.
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hardly fail to be healthily intimidated and impressed. Best evidence of 
this result emerges from the statistics; a cumulative study of the last 
five years indicates that more than half of the juveniles dismissed after 
one of these hearings never reappear before Youth Aid Division officers.25 
If a juvenile with a prior record reflects an uncooperative attitude at 
the hearing, the hearing officer will send the case to Juvenile Court.
Traffic violations provide the only instance in which formal restric­
tions on a juvenile will issue from these hearings. In such cases the 
police may compel attendance at Traffic School. Since the Juvenile 
Court also sends offenders to the Traffic School, question may be raised 
as to whether the concept which justifies the police hearings—that they 
circumvent unnecessary adjudications—is not undermined by the fact 
that in these cases the police are duplicating a judicial disposition. A 
second less questionable consequence of these hearings is reference of 
the child to the city-wide Commissioner’s Youth Council program, where 
his participation is on a voluntary basis.
In summary, five characteristics mark these hearings: (1) except for 
the question posed by the traffic school referrals, these hearings never 
result in any form of punishment or treatment by the police, penal or re­
habilitative dispositions being left exclusively with Juvenile Court; 
(2) they nearly halve the number of cases which would otherwise 
burden the court, and thus permit more time for the cases the court 
already has, while preventing delay and the involuntary injustice of 
summary treatment in the handling of those cases now kept out of the 
court; (3) they are preventively effective, by statistical showing; (4) 
but, they are of questionable legality; and (5) they are without the 
benefit of a social evaluation such as is introduced before the disposi­
tion of every case heard by the Juvenile Court. Inasmuch as these 
hearings are without statutory authorization, it may be contended that 
they should be eliminated. Yet their practicable elimination can only be 
effected if Juvenile Court judicial and administrative personnel are in­
creased by the Congress. Since continued congressional intransigence is 
to be anticipated, the alleviation of the present court’s burden cannot 
be counted upon in the foreseeable future. To observe the strict letter 
of the Juvenile Court Act, then, by closing off the police hearings and 
referring every single case to the court without benefit of the screening 
technique, would appear to be folly of the highest order. A doctrinaire 
approach to the problem of a swamped juvenile system clearly will not
25 1959-60 Annual Report, note 22 supra.
H e i n O n l i n e  - -  49 Geo. L . J . 329 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 1
330 T h e  Georgetow n  L aw  J o u r n a l  [V ol. 4 9 : p. 322
do. Until Congress sees fit to authorize additional manpower for the 
court, the solution to the legal problem posed by police hearings lies 
alternatively with either continuing publicly to ignore their implications, 
which most officials do, or with legislatively ratifying them and putting 
a power of review in the Juvenile Court to insure against the growth of 
abusive practices in the exercise of police discretion.
II
T h e  S ocial  Se r v ic e  D iv is io n  o f  t h e  J u v e n il e  C ou r t
Usually within a day after police commitment to the Receiving Home 
and court receipt of notice of the placement through the police com­
plaint, the court’s social intake procedures begin. A social worker in the 
Juvenile Intake Section of the court’s nonjudicial Social Service Division 
is assigned to the boy and visits him as swiftly as possible at the Home. 
The time lag between commitment and this visit may be limited to scant 
hours, but under current workloads a social worker may not see the child 
until after he has conferred with the parents who are called to the Juve­
nile Intake Section of the court the day after commitment. This con­
ference is designed to acquaint the social worker with the family and with 
background information concerning the child. The parents are in turn 
fully informed of the alleged offense. In rare cases, the social worker may 
decide on the basis of this conference that the juvenile should be released 
to his home, and this request is channeled to the Director of Social Ser­
vice for approval; but in most instances the narrow result of the meeting 
is to schedule further contacts with the parents and to provide the social 
worker with factual guideposts from which he can undertake a brief 
study of the youth.
The material accumulated in this study together with information 
gleaned from a maximum of three visits with the boy at the Receiving 
Home is reported to the Director of Social Service of the court in order 
to assist that official at the time he holds a preliminary hearing or, as it is 
called, “the Director’s Conference.” This hearing, at which the youth, his 
parents, his attorney, the social worker, and the Social Director can all 
theoretically be present,26 is under current court policy to be held within 
five days of the court’s receipt of the complaint or “as soon thereafter 
as scheduling permits.”27 At the present time, inmates of the Receiving 
Home are brought in within the stated period, but juveniles released to
26 Policy Memorandum No. 2, D.C. Juv. Ct., p. 1 (rev. Sept. 17, 1959). ■
27 Ibid.
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their parents upon arrest often must wait longer for the hearing, the 
delay finding justification under the quoted escape clause.
When held, it is only rarely that an attorney is present. The small 
number of attorneys who appear—in approximately one out of every 
ten cases—is unsurprising since notice of the right to have counsel pres­
ent at the hearing is not given beforehand, and the realization of the 
right is therefore left solely to the imagination and initiative of the 
parent. Given the indifferent attitude of many parents, the absence of 
counsel at the preliminary hearing is in consequence a normal occur­
rence. Such absence is not flatly condemnatory of the system, since the 
preliminary hearing is held only to determine whether a petition, anal­
ogous to an information in the criminal law, will be filed. Juvenile Court 
jurisdiction does not officially attach until the petition is filed and, upon 
filing, it binds the youth over for an appearance before the Juvenile 
Court bench. In no strict sense can the hearing be regarded as an adju­
dication of delinquent status. The Director is not a judicial officer, the 
hearing is not judicial in nature, nor will information offered by either 
probation officer, parent or juvenile be later admitted in Juvenile Court 
in the event the adolescent denies involvement in the act and is held over 
for trial. Nevertheless, presence of counsel would appear to be a desir­
able aspect of the proceedings; the Director can and frequently does 
determine not to file a petition,28 and the presence of a persuasive ad­
vocate on behalf of a boy could well turn the hearing officer in favor 
of a deserved dismissal. Since internment at the Receiving Home for at 
least a month or more may result if a petition is filed, unless the Director 
is persuaded to release him in the interim to his parents, the youth 
should at the preliminary hearing have the benefit of all available assist­
ance in resisting this potential deprivation of liberty. It follows that 
notice should be given to all parties that counsel may attend the hearing, 
and furthermore, in case of financial hardship, the court should appoint 
an attorney to serve the juvenile’s cause during these pre-adjudicatory 
proceedings. The Director himself has classified the now sporadic ap­
pearance of counsel “constructive,” with exception reserved toward 
those who enter the conference imagining it to be a preliminary hearing 
before a United States Commissioner.
At the present time, twelve conferences are held each morning at the 
Juvenile Court building. The purpose of the hearings as propounded
28 The Annual Statistical Report for the Juvenile Court for fiscal 1960 indicates that 
828 delinquency cases were disposed of during the year by the Director of Social Service 
without judicial action.
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in a Juvenile Court policy memorandum29 is to determine whether the 
interests of the public or of the child require that judicial action be 
taken in relation to children referred to the court. Under current work­
loads, this complex determination is given an average 15 to 20 minutes 
per case hearing. The following order of business, occasionally varied, 
normally characterizes each conference: parents, juvenile, the occasional 
attorney and the caseworker enter the conference room off the Juvenile 
Courtroom and sit opposite the Director. The complaining witness or 
witnesses are not present. Introductions ensue and the Director reads 
the complaint filed by the police against the youth. Upon completion of 
this reading, he informs the parties that he will decide at the conclusion 
of the conference whether a petition will be filed and the case thereby 
held over for judicial disposition. If the juvenile has been transported 
from the Receiving Home for the conference, the Director adds that he 
will reach the further determination as to whether the boy will be re­
turned to the home or released to his parents pending the trial.30 The 
youth is then asked whether he did the acts charged. If he admits, he is 
briskly asked why. If he denies, he is asked to explain why he thinks 
he was charged. Denial draws the Director’s advice as to right of 
counsel and the availability of court-appointed attorneys if required. 
Any explanation to be made regarding the offense then follows, during 
the course of which the Director scans the juvenile’s record for signs of 
previous difficulty with the law. When the boy finishes, usually quickly 
and inarticulately, the Director asks for the social worker’s report from 
which he derives essential assistance in reaching a decision. The worker 
relates his knowledge of the offense, of the boy’s background, habits and 
schooling, or as much of these as he has been able to learn from the 
study permitted by the limited space of time between arrest and con­
ference. Any recommendations the social worker has are heard. The 
parents are then asked if they have any statement to make. Similarly, 
the attorney is asked to contribute as he or she wishes. Following all 
the statements, the Director returns his attention to the juvenile and, 
in the case of a confession, asks him if he understands the wrongfulness 
of his act, if he has learned anything from his experience since the 
offense, and if he thinks this sort of act might occur again. The answers 
elicited are obvious and vary little from case to case. By this point, the 
Director has reached a decision as to both petition and release, the
20 Policy Memorandum No. 2, supra note 26, at 1.
30 In rare instances, the decision has been made to confine a juvenile in the Receiving 
Home who had been in parental custody between arrest and Director’s conference.
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latter heavily conditioned by the nature of the offense and the juvenile’s 
recidivistic tendencies, if any, as indicated by the record. The parties 
are dismissed after the Director announces his determinations.
These determinations under official court policy are alternatively to 
dismiss or to petition, and if to petition, then to release or to continue 
confinement. In practice, however, fifteen per cent of the cases en­
counter a third type of disposition which falls somewhere between 
petition and dismissal. This is the decision to defer the petition for fur­
ther study.31
Essentially, deferment entails a stern warning to the juvenile that he 
must maintain good behavior throughout an informal probation period, 
during which he will be kept under social supervision and may be re­
quired to report to the Social Service at regular intervals. In the 
meantime, the petition will be held in abeyance. Failure to meet the 
unofficial probationary conditions will presumably result in filing, since 
in theory no petition is deferred unless the child has admitted the offense, 
thus providing sufficient legal ground to support judicial action. How­
ever, the official court memorandum32 supporting deferment sets forth no 
minimal legal criteria which must be satisfied before resort to deferment 
procedure is permissible.
Deferment is a unilateral Social Service measure and is not reviewed 
by the Assistant Corporation Counsel or the judicial division of the 
court. The only disturbing legal aspect of this practice is that nothing 
but the Director’s discretion currently prevents the deferment from 
being utilized in cases where probable cause to believe the child is 
guilty does not appear but where surveillance of the child is neverthe­
less deemed wise for various indefinable social reasons. The fact that 
great discretionary power is exercised with benevolence in the present 
does not justify that power for all future time, and it may therefore be 
suggested that some minimal check be installed with regard to deferment 
to insure that no child is ever restricted without sufficient cause.
Assuming a decision to file a petition at the close of the conference, a 
date is set for court appearance and the petition is drawn up and for­
warded to the Assistant Corporation Counsel’s office for the Juvenile 
Court. This office performs dual functions resembling those of an ap­
pellate court with respect to the Director’s decision to file or dismiss.
31 See Policy Memorandum No. 2, supra note 26, at 2.
32 Ibid. The Probation officer must have a report and recommendation ready within
90 days after conference if the child is at liberty, within 30 days if he is in the Receiving 
Home.
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A decision either way is presumably reviewed in each case by an as­
sistant corporation counsel. If the Director’s decision to dismiss is not 
agreeable, the Corporation Counsel’s office can file its own petition and 
thereby insure that the case will come before the court for judicial dis­
position. Conversely, the corporation counsel may veto the Director’s 
decision to file by failing to approve the petition for legal sufficiency. 
The Director is without recourse in that event, and the case is dismissed. 
In practice, however, Assistant Corporation Counsel rarely fails to 
rubber-stamp the Director’s decisions, which thus roll across the govern­
ment desk in an unimpeded pro forma parade.
It may be valuable to observe at this point the considerable police 
unrest at the fact that the power over preliminary release of a committed 
juvenile resides in a Social Service officer and not a lawyer.33 A common 
complaint is that some “fairly tough boys,” guilty of fairly violent 
offenses, are all too often dismissed to their parents because the individual 
determining such release is not trained to comprehend the legal gravity 
of the juvenile’s act. Rather in making his decision, the Director relies on 
such criteria as the juvenile’s past record, the impression he and his par­
ents create at the conference, and the social worker’s report on the home 
and school situations. The alternative to the present method would be to 
put the power of decision in Assistant Corporation Counsel or some ju­
dicial officer, such as a master, with the Social Service officers acting 
objectively in advisory capacities. At the very least, Assistant Corpora­
tion Counsel should give greater attention than has been given to the 
results of these Director conferences, in terms of both the petition’s legal 
sufficiency and the danger to the community if an adolescent is released 
pending trial.
A final question exists in some quarters as to whether there is statu­
tory authority to justify the action taken at the Director’s conference of 
confining or reconfining the child in the Receiving Home. The Juvenile 
Court Act provides that no child “shall be held in such place of deten­
tion for any period longer than five days, excluding Sundays and 
holidays, unless the judge shall order such child detained for a further 
period.”34 Since the Director in effect now makes this order, the question 
becomes whether the power is properly delegated to him. As the Di­
33 The criticism is inapplicable to the present incumbent of the Directorship, who has 
a law degree in addition to sociological training. But no rule or policy currently prevailing 
insures that a lawyer will always hold the position.
34 66 Stat. 134 (1952), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-912 (Supp. VIII, 1960), amending 52 
Stat. 598 (1938). (Emphasis added.)
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rector sits in a theoretically civil capacity, under the administrative 
direction of the judge,35 and is authorized to have charge of all social 
work of the court,36 the decision to confine seems properly left in his 
hands, for it is reached largely on the grounds of the welfare of the 
child or of the community, both of which evaluations may be considered 
“social” in nature without snapping the thread of definition.
At the close of the hearing, fie  juvenile is returned to the Receiving 
Home where he may wait as long as two months for his appearance 
before the bench in Juvenile Court. The delay is occasioned by the huge 
backlog of cases presently burdening the court,37 the alleviation of 
which unquestionably lies in congressionally authorized additions to the 
court’s judicial and administrative personnel. Since the Receiving Home 
must serve as a place of lengthy confinement for juveniles, where they 
are separated, for better or for worse, from freedom and conventional 
surroundings, that institution’s operation will bear brief review below.
To be noted also is the post-conference assignment to the juvenile 
of a probation officer (a social worker) who in the period between the 
Director’s conference and the court appearance will attempt to gather 
sufficient information concerning the child in order to present a useful 
recommendation to the judge once that official has determined the juve­
nile’s status upon the arraignment or the trial.
There are presently fourteen social workers in the court’s Probation 
Section, which is distinct from the Juvenile Intake Section although 
under the same general direction of the head of the Social Service Divi­
sion. A reorganization plan currently underway contemplates the addi­
tion of one more probation officer to the staff. Each officer has approx­
imately 90 juveniles, almost evenly divided between pre-adjudication 
and post-adjudication probation cases, for which he or she is responsible. 
One official noted that ideally this load would be closer to 50 cases. But 
analysis of the simple factor of time available suggests that even 50 
cases are too many. The social worker is presumed to see as much of 
probationers as of juveniles undergoing the social study before adjudica­
tion; he is expected to evaluate the home, the financial, educational and 
cultural circumstances of family life, the schooling, habits and outside 
interests of the juvenile, the interaction characterizing the parent-child 
relationship, and a myriad of other factors entering a proper social
35 52 Stat. 602 (1938), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-923 (1951).
36 Ibid.
37 Compilation for the third quarter of 1960 indicated a backlog of approximately 1900 
cases, including both adults and juveniles. -
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study; to these ends, he is expected to meet regularly with the child, 
ideally once a week, and even more frequently with the parents, and to 
have contact with school or employers. After the average eight-week 
period between petition and disposition—often less in cases where the 
juvenile is in the Receiving Home, more when the child is in parental 
custody—has passed, he is expected to present a carefully conceived 
evaluation and recommendation on the case by way of assisting the 
Juvenile Court judge in the latter’s attempt to dispose equitably of the 
juvenile before him. The absurdity of this expectation emerges upon 
brief reflection; assuming a five-.day, forty-hour week for the probation 
officer, and further assuming the two-month prolongation between peti­
tion and courtroom proceeding, the officer with not 90, but only 80 cases 
can devote precisely 30 minutes a week to each, or 4 irregular hours 
over the entire pre-adjudicatory period. Assuming the theoretically ideal 
burden of 50 cases per probation officer, approximately 48 minutes a week 
or 6 hours over the period is available for each case. These figures 
discount, of course, time spent composing written reports, attending 
staff meetings, appearing in courtroom proceedings, and traveling to and 
from the necessary sources of social information. The consequences are 
obvious: the officer rarely has a satisfactory contact with the child or the 
parents, discharges many of his duties by telephone, suffers the frustra­
tion of watching his training spread thinly and uselessly over a tragically 
wide problem area, and ends up penning an admittedly superficial eval­
uation on which the judge then relies in determining the future course 
for the juvenile. Both the Commissioners for the District of Columbia 
and Congress’ self-appointed authorities on juvenile treatment, who 
presently stall the authorization of additional court personnel, might 
well take notice of the waste.
I l l
T h e  R e c e iv in g  H o m e  f o r  C h il d r e n
The present Home was opened as a detention center in 1949 with a 
capacity for 40 inmates. Rampant overcrowding over the following 
eight-year period precipitated an expansion of facilities to accommodate 
90 in 1957. In only two years in its entire eleven-year history has the 
Home housed on an average less than or exactly at capacity. One con­
sequence has been that, during peak periods, the beds run out and in­
mates sleep on mattresses on the floor. One official of the Home has 
noted, in regard to overcrowding, that while occasionally bedding and 
clothing supplies are depleted, there remains the assurance that sufficient
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food will always be available. The Home is not governed by the Juvenile 
Court, but by the Department of Public Welfare, and the wide discre­
tionary policies of Home treatment and care permitted the Department 
are not reviewable by the court. While not obviously unfortunate, this 
split of command over persons theoretically subject to the same rehabil­
itative system does not lend itself to the unity of treatment or control 
which should be ideally sought in working with children over a period 
of sensitive months or years. Whatever danger inheres in this split is 
exacerbated by the additional fragmenting which characterizes later 
handling of a juvenile in the case where he is committed to the National 
Training School for Boys, which is directed by the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, and where he is technically in the custody of the Attorney Gen­
eral of the United States. That officer, as will be discussed, possesses 
statutory power to commit the boy to a federal prison for adult criminals.
When a juvenile suspected of delinquency is committed to the Home, 
usually by Youth Aid Division police officers, a brief history is taken, 
he is immediately showered, dressed in khaki and sweat shirt, and under­
goes a medical examination before being placed in one of the Home 
living units. The units or groups of inmates into which newcomers are 
placed are determined roughly by age. Temperament is advertised as a 
second determining factor, but the brief amount of time spent analyzing 
the child before he is integrated into a group belies the idea.
Department of Public Welfare personnel handle these groups individ­
ually in various work, physical training, schooling, and counseling ac­
tivities. Although the Receiving Home is a detention center and not a 
corrective agency or training school, Home officials term these programs 
rehabilitative and all inmates participate in them. Strictly speaking, the 
operations of the Home in this respect involve a presumption of guilt; 
inmates undergo a rehabilitation process before any showing that re­
habilitation is required; a juvenile is cured before proof is entered that 
he is wayward.
Doubtless the operation of a detention center on a rehabilitative 
principle could be justified by a showing that these operations entailed 
only healthy, time-consuming work, obviously good for any child, and 
did not in the least partake of the punitive or criminal aura. That such 
a refreshing state of affairs exists is not at all clear. Perhaps most 
damaging to the image of cheering rehabilitative work at the Home is 
the questionable practice of punishing uncooperative or otherwise dif­
ficult detainees by ushering them into solitary confinement for periods 
ranging from twenty-four hours upward. A visit to the Home disclosed
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that solitary cells are without bedding; a blanket suffices as both mat­
tress and cover for the inmate sleeping on a concrete floor. Inmates 
report minimal internments in solitary as of four- and five-day duration, 
which is sharply at odds with the statements of Home officials. Although 
much of what an inmate of any institution reports as abuse may be dis­
counted as an unjustified expression of aggravated concern for personal 
plight, the idea of even a 48-hour bedless confinement in solitary at a 
pre-adjudicatory detention and “rehabilitation” center may well deserve 
review. It is to be observed that solitary confinement, although fre­
quently invoked by Home personnel for punitive purposes, finds no 
mention in the Annual Report of that institution’s operations. Undoubt­
edly, separating particularly obstructive or anti-social individuals from 
the group for the benefit of the cooperative majority is a sound and meri­
torious measure; but at a detention center holding unjudged juvenile 
suspects and professing an orientation towards a rehabilitative end, it 
should not be a punitive measure.
The Home is heavily secured, and occasional runaways have com­
pelled the innovation of prison locks on main doors, collared locks on 
inner passageways. The constant necessity for a counselor with a key, 
if one is to travel any distance, may contribute to the feeling among 
some of the more sophisticated juveniles, as one Home official stated, 
that they are undergoing a criminal process. Of the few inmates recently 
interviewed, including females, most considered their detention punish­
ment and were free with their use of the word “jail,” an institution ex­
pressly precluded from use for the detention of juveniles38 in the District 
of Columbia. If it is fair to say that the nature of a system is partly 
determined by the psychological reaction of the individuals subjected 
to it, the Home may therefore be more a jail than a juvenile detention 
center. But reality commands the quickly added remark that, given the 
escape wish in juveniles as well as in adults, perhaps a jail it must be.
The Trimble39 Decision. Until recently, there appeared to be no 
method of being released from the Receiving Home without the approval 
of the Juvenile Court. But in September 1960, Judge Holtzoff of the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia in a habeas 
corpus proceeding admitted to bail a fifteen-year old inmate of the Re­
ceiving Home who had been incarcerated there pending a trial in the
38 52 Stat. 602 (1938), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-927 (1951).
.30 Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960), appeal docketed, No. 16037, D.C. 
Cir., Oct. 18, 1960.
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Juvenile Court for assault.40 The decision was the first in this jurisdiction 
to recognize the eighth-amendment right to bail as obtaining for a juve­
nile.41 In casting aside considerations of the civil nature of juvenile pro­
ceedings and the Juvenile Court Act’s silence as to bail, the court 
determined that the only test as to the applicability of constitutional 
guarantees was one of physical freedom: “If as a result of an infraction 
of law, the proceedings may result in depriving a person of liberty, the 
protection of the Bill of Rights is applicable.”42 Since the petitioner faced 
detention of up to several months in the Receiving Home pending trial,43 
and the risk thereafter of an indeterminate commitment to the National 
Training School for Boys or a federal reformatory,44 the court found 
that the right to bail applied.
The decision evokes not only the familiar discussion as to the status 
of juveniles vis-a-vis Bill of Rights guarantees,45 but expressly notes the 
important argument against the unrestricted application of those rights.
The Court recognizes that it may be desirable in the interest of the public, or 
even in the interest of the individual, in some instances to confine the accused 
while awaiting final disposition of his case, instead of permitting him to be lib­
erated on bail. . . . [But] it is far more important to preserve the basic safe­
guards of the Bill of Rights, which were developed as a result of centuries of 
experience, than it is to sacrifice any one of them in order to achieve a desirable 
result in an individual case, no matter how beneficial it may seem to be for the 
moment.46
The persuasion in this sweeping constitutional argument must be ac­
cepted as irresistible, but it does not solve all the problems which are 
posed by the uniquely incapable status of minors. If all children today 
in the Receiving Home have a constitutional right to bail, many may 
be sent home to the most sordid and dangerous situations the community 
has to offer. By this is not meant merely colder meals, less care and 
more dirt in the home, as one concerned Juvenile Court official pointed 
out, but in numerous known cases, to incestuous relations, extreme 
alcoholism, and other equally primitive conditions. Unlike the adult
40 Ibid.
41 Former Judge Cockrill regularly set bail, but Judge Ketcham terminated this practice.
42 187 F. Supp. at 486.
43 Id. at 484.
44 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1958).
45 See, e.g., Powell, Constitutional Safeguards in Juvenile Courts, 35 Notre Dame 
Law. 220 (1960); Comment, Constitutional Rights and the Juvenile Court—The Need for 
National Unity and Federal Intervention, 5 Vill. L. Rev. 107 (1959).
4a 187 F. Supp, at 488.
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freed on bail, where the risk lies wholly on society, a child liberated 
poses the greater risk to his own welfare; only secondarily is the risk to 
the community of significance. The child is, in the realistic view of the 
law, frequently incapable of adequately protecting himself. It follows, 
therefore, that while under a constitutional system every individual 
charged with an offense must have a right to bail, to leave the matter 
there in the case of a juvenile is not enough. The additional power must 
be put in the Juvenile Court to assume jurisdiction to commit the child, 
on the basis of dependency, not delinquency, if it appears upon sufficient 
investigation that exposure to his home life will be debilitating. One 
may term this dependency jurisdiction a device subject to abuse, but 
clearly the constitutional assurance of liberty may be justifiably dimin­
ished when liberty itself is a greater evil than confinement.
Two practical problems immediately mark the innovation of juvenile 
bail and a dependency jurisdiction alternative to the jurisdiction over 
delinquency. As to bail, no machinery currently exists for the swift 
presentation of a juvenile before a United States Commissioner where 
bail could be set. But correctional legislation may supply the answer 
to this difficulty. An appearance before a United States Commissioner 
need not lead to incarceration in the D.C. Jail; the Receiving Home, 
where at the very least the juvenile is kept separate from adult criminals, 
would remain the designated place of commitment, the difference after 
legislation being that the power to commit is in a judicial officer, not a 
policeman. It is difficult to discern the greater rehabilitive good accruing 
to a juvenile when the policeman has that power, as he now does. Once 
the commitment is accomplished and the complaint is received by the 
Juvenile Court, the social worker assigned by the court could commence 
the standard investigation, adding a special inquiry as to home conditions 
in view of the possibility that the court may have to assume dependency 
jurisdiction if bail is forthcoming. This possibility introduces the second 
problem. Clearly the idea of a dependency jurisdiction to counter bail 
involves enormously increased paperwork and responsibility for the 
court’s social and administrative personnel, and will require that the 
judge spend additional time—a precious commodity in this system—on 
cases which under present arrangements do not require that attention. 
But this argument ultimately leads the listener back to Capitol Hill, for it 
is there, in the District Committee possessing the power to recommend 
legislation which would authorize the additional staff so critically needed 
by the court, that the solution to most juvenile-system problems resides.
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IV
W a iv e r  of  J u r is d ic t io n
Under the Juvenile Court Act, the judge of the Juvenile Court may 
waive jurisdiction to the United States district court47 in cases where a 
juvenile between the ages of 16 and 18 has committed an act which 
would have been a felony if perpetrated by an adult, or where a juvenile 
of any age has committed an act which if committed by an adult would 
be punishable by death or life imprisonment.48 While the decision to 
waive is embodied in an order which can be signed only by the Juvenile 
Court judge, numerous opinions are voiced one way or the other during 
Social Intake proceedings, and the judge heavily relies on these in reach­
ing his determination. Normally in the case of a crime falling within 
the statutory categories, the Youth Aid Division will attach to its com­
plaint filed at the court a recommendation that jurisdiction be waived 
to the District Court for the District of Columbia. The Chief of the 
Intake Section, acting in conjunction with the probation or social worker 
assigned to the juvenile, similarly forms an opinion as to waiver which is 
forwarded with the police recommendation to the Director of Social 
Service. Conferences between the Director, other Social Service offi­
cials, and the police may follow. In instances where doubt exists as to 
the legal sufficiency of the complaint, insofar as it must be passed on by 
a grand jury in the district court, Juvenile Court legal assistants will 
consult with the United States Attorney. The Director of Social Service 
for the Juvenile Court may or may not determine the utility of waiver 
before a conference with the suspect. Conferences are usually not held. 
But it is reasonable to observe that in instances where a conference is 
held with waiver in issue, the presence of an attorney could be poten­
tially of great service to the juvenile, considering the gravity of the 
consequences which may attend a waiver and subsequent trial in an 
adult court. Such instances would therefore seem to strengthen the ar­
gument favoring notice to the juvenile of right to counsel immediately 
after his apprehension, instead of a continuation of the current practice 
of notice only when the juvenile denies involvement at the Director’s 
conference.
Both Director’s and judge’s final opinion as to waiver are conditioned
47 Nothing in the act militates against waiver to the Municipal Court for the District 
of Columbia, but the district court is always selected.
48 52 Stat. 599 (1938), as amended, 61 Stat. 92 (1947), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-914 
(1951); Briggs v. United States, 96 U.S. App. D.C. 392, 226 F.2d 350 (1955).
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by criteria set forth in a Juvenile Court policy memorandum.49 These 
include considerations such as the nature of the crime, the manner in 
which it was committed, its prosecutive merit before a grand jury, the 
maturity of the suspect and the age of his companions in the offense, his 
record, and his susceptibility to rehabilitation. Once the judge signs the 
waiver order, Youth Aid police officers proceed to the Receiving Home 
where the child is collected and taken forthwith to a magistrate for a pre­
liminary hearing. The juvenile, suddenly an adult confronted by the 
criminal law, is then committed to the D.C. Jail pending arraignment and 
trial. All guarantees and protections of the Constitution and the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure immediately and unequivocally obtain.50
Presentment before a grand jury is the first government step to follow 
the preliminary hearing before a United States Commissioner.51 At this 
point, a curious situation has occasionally occurred in the past. If the 
grand jury fails to return an indictment for a felony, the case may be 
sent to the Municipal Court for trial as a misdemeanor. But since the 
Municipal Court has persistently denied its jurisdiction to try a juvenile 
for an offense of less stature than a felony, the suspect is therefore set 
free. No formal opinions appear in explanation of the Municipal Court’s 
refusal to try, but several explanations may be hazarded. First, the 
Juvenile Court Act grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over pre- 
18-year-old juvenile offenses to the Juvenile Court.52 Other District 
courts, including the Municipal Court, can receive juvenile cases only 
in the event of a felony or capital crime since these provide the only 
instances when the Juvenile Court may waive.53 If the district court 
grand jury in effect reduces the charge to a misdemeanor by failing to 
bring in a felony indictment, the calibre of the crime topples into the 
category of offenses which are delivered exclusively into the jurisdiction 
of the Juvenile Court by the statute, and as to which that court has no 
discretion to waive. The Municipal Court may therefore logically be­
lieve it is precluded from assuming jurisdiction. On the other hand, the 
argument may be advanced that since the Juvenile Court has waived 
jurisdiction, the child has assumed an adult criminal status and may
49 Policy Memorandum No. 7, D.C. Juv. Ct. (rev. Nov. 30, 1959).
50 Pee v. United States, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 47, 51, 274 F.2d 556, 560 (1959).
51 Id. at 50-51, 274 F.2d at 559-60. In fiscal 1959-1960, 77 indictments were returned in 
the 89 cases waived by the Juvenile Court. 1959-60 Annual Report, note 22 supra.
52 52 Stat. 597 (1938), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-907 (1951). •
53 52 Stat. 599 (1938), as amended, 61 Stat. 92 (1947), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-914 (1951); 
United States v. Anonymous, 176 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1959). -
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thereafter be tried for any degree of criminality provable from the par­
ticular transaction out of which the case originally arose. Although the 
idea has never been formally stated, the district court appears to believe 
it could try a juvenile for a misdemeanor if it so chose, but does not 
do so only because of a policy against trying any misdemeanors what­
ever, regardless of the defendant’s age. In a distinguishable situation, 
the district court has never had difficulty accepting a guilty plea for a 
lesser included offense from a juvenile over whom jurisdiction was 
waived and against whom the grand jury had returned a felony indict­
ment.
When the Municipal Court refuses to hear a misdemeanor charge, a 
hiatus results because the Juvenile Court in such cases is not recorded 
as ever having resumed the jurisdiction it had earlier waived, and 
consequently the suspect returns unblemished to the community. Doubt 
exists in the present Juvenile Court as to whether such a resumption of 
jurisdiction would be legal. Under the former direction of Judge Edith 
Cockrill, jurisdiction was never assumed anew, even for offenses com­
mitted by juveniles subsequent to the offense waived. However, the 
current judicial incumbent in Juvenile Court explicitly waives only as 
to the single felony or capital crime and believes the court maintains 
jurisdiction for offenses subsequent to that one precipitating the waiver.
Once an indictment is obtained by the United States Attorney, the 
juvenile defendant is arraigned and tried. Discretion exists in the district 
court, however, to try the defendant as a juvenile.54 But to do so would 
seemingly require a dismissal of the indictment, the filing of a petition 
duplicating that which would be used in a normal Juvenile Court 
adjudication,05 and the withdrawal of the prosecuting services of the 
United States Attorney in favor of a substitution of the Corporation 
Counsel for the District of Columbia. Confronted by this procedural 
maze, the district court has refused in all but one case to sit in a juvenile 
capacity since early I960.56 A further factor militating against district 
court utilization of the juvenile proceeding may be the unfortunate effect 
it would have of reversing the Juvenile Court decision to waive.
The Juvenile Court Act provides that a child’s social and delinquency 
record is available to any court before which the child may appear,57
54 See Pee v. United States, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 47, 51, 274 F.2d 556, 560 (1959).
Ibid.
56 Washington Post, Nov. 29, 1960, § B, p. 1, col. 6. The case is not reported.
67 66 Stat. 134 (1952), D.C. Code Ann. § ll-929(b) (Supp. VIII, I960), amending 52 
Stat. 603 (1938). Although the “shall make available” language of this provision appears
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which of course includes the District Court of the District of Columbia 
in waiver cases. But the Juvenile Court judge’s discretion to deny access 
to such records to “other interested persons, institutions and agencies”68 
has seemingly been limited by a recent district court order which called for 
such records to be made available to defense attorneys appointed in a 
case waived to district court, in order to assist those officers in preparing 
for the adult trial.59 Whether the district court can or will use the 
subpoena power to make these confidential records further available to 
other parties whose interests are not clearly accommodated by the Juve­
nile Court Act remains an open question.60
The ordinary criminal trial of the juvenile, then, normally ensues and 
is characterized by all the conventional criminal protections accorded an 
accused adult.*1 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure doubtless 
apply,62 as does the Mallory rule63 which precludes the admission at trial 
of statements received by police during a period of illegal pre-trial de­
tention. Exactly what period of detention will be examined to determine 
the applicability of Mallory has yet to be determined, but presumably it 
will be that time between the juvenile’s original apprehension and the 
filing of a complaint by the police with the Juvenile Court. Conceivably 
the commitment to the Receiving Home, which is frequently previous to 
filing the complaint, as in cases of a midnight apprehension, will mark the 
terminal point of the examinable period. Yet a third possibility exists 
with the period from apprehension until post-waiver presentation before 
a United States Commissioner, since it is a common police practice to
mandatory, the view of current Juvenile Court personnel is that the availability of records 
is a matter of discretion for the Juvenile Court judge. His practice now is to make such 
records available in three contingencies: (1) when a defendant over whom Juvenile 
Court has waived jurisdiction seeks to persuade the district court to conduct a juvenile 
proceeding instead of a criminal trial; (2) when a defendant over whom jurisdiction has 
been waived to the district court seeks to launch a legal attack on the Juvenile Court 
judge’s discretion in waiving the case; (3) when the district court needs such record 
for pre-sentence investigation in waiver cases.
58 66 Stat. 134 (1952), D.C. Code Ann. § ll-929(a) (Supp. VIII, I960), amending 52 
Stat. 603 (1938).
B9 United States v. Armstead, Crim. No. 898-60, D.D.C., Nov. 21, 1960. For newspaper 
account see Washington Post, Nov. 29, 1960, § B, p. 1, col. 6.
60 Judge Orman W. Ketcham doubts the legal support obtaining for such district court 
orders and has expressed a desire for appellate court review. Washington Post, Nov. 29, 
1960, § B, p. 1, col. 6.
61 Pee v. United States, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 47, 51, 274 F.2d 556, 560 (1959).
«2 Ibid.
es id. at 52, 274 F.2d at 561.
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visit the Receiving Home for additional investigation following com­
mitment. These visits presently occur at a rate of two to three a week 
for all cases combined. Since these few visits cannot be in connection 
with all the cases pending, the period between apprehension and post­
waiver presentation before the Commissioner may be used for purposes 
of the M allory rule only as to those cases where post-commitment visits 
have been made. In this respect, the rule, as in adult cases, will have 
flexible application, unrestricted to a definite time period.
If a conviction is obtained upon the trial, the sentence will involve a 
typical adult criminal penalty, and the juvenile can be committed to 
an adult federal prison or reformatory. He irrevocably obtains a criminal 
record, and it is doubtful whether he will ever return to the quasi-benev- 
olent fold of the juvenile system.
V
T h e  J u v e n il e  i n  C o u r t
No physical difference between the Juvenile Court and an adult civil 
or criminal court is perceptible when one enters a delinquency proceed­
ing; bailiffs, U.S. marshals, clerks, court stenographers, and a judge 
on an elevated dais are all present. There is the difference, however, 
that when the juvenile appears before the bench, he or she is accompanied 
by parent or guardian, the assigned social worker, and in those cases 
where a trial is to ensue, by a representative of Assistant Corporation 
Counsel,64 who in effect assumes the role of prosecutor.
The great distinction appearing between juvenile and adult criminal 
proceedings lies in the area of constitutional guarantees. Since the juve­
nile proceeding is characterized as civil, Bill of Rights guarantees which 
belong to one accused of crime are inapplicable in Juvenile Court adjudi­
cations. More specifically, the following rights are not constitutionally 
guaranteed in these proceedings: (1) the right to counsel;65 (2) the 
right to public trial;66 (3) the right to trial by jury;67 (4) the
52 Stat. 603 (1938), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-932 (1951).
85 U.S. Const, amend. VI; e.g., Shioutakon v. United States, 98 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 
236 F.2d 666, 60 A.L.R.2d 686 (1956).
08 U.S. Const, amend. VI. The Juvenile Court Act specifically denies this right. 52 
Stat. 599 (1938), as amended, 66 Stat. 134 (1952), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-915 (Supp. VIII, 
1960).
07 U.S. Const, amend. VI. But the Juvenile Court Act grants a statutory right to jury 
trial. 52 Stat. 599 (1938), as amended, 66 Stat. 134 (1952), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-915 
(Supp. V in , 1960).
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necessity for grand jury indictment where the juvenile is held for a 
capital or otherwise infamous crime;68 (5) the right to a speedy trial;69 
(6) the protection from being compelled to give self-incriminating evi­
dence;70 (7) the protection against being placed in jeopardy twice for the 
same offense;71 (8) the right to bail;72 and (9) the right to be confronted 
by one’s accusers.73
In practice, rights essentially analogous to a few of the above are 
made applicable by the statute or by judicial interpretation of due 
process. Thus where legislative fiat has included such guarantees in the 
statute or where they fall within the meaning of due process,74 the 
juvenile will be assured at least of the most basic of these rights; but 
even here assurance lasts only as long as the legislative will remains 
unchanged or the judiciary continues to recognize a right as essential to 
a concept of fair play.
Although the act nowhere expressly provides for the right to counsel, 
Shioutakon v. United States75 held that the Juvenile Court judge must 
advise the child of that right and, in the case of an indigent respondent, 
must appoint counsel if demand is made. However, Shioutakon rejected 
the contention that the right to counsel was basically a constitutional one, 
predicating this determination on the rationale that the right is only 
applicable in a criminal case which a juvenile proceeding is not. Recogniz­
ing the necessity for counsel but classifying juvenile cases as civil rather
68 U.S. Const, amend. V; cf. Ex parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123 (S.D. Ohio 1911); 
State v. Goldberg, 124 N.JX. 272, 11 A.2d 299 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
69 U.S. Const, amend. VI; cf. Hampton v. Stevenson, 210 Ga. 87, 78 S.E.2d 33 (1933).
70 U.S. Const, amend. V; cf. In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (Dist. Ct. 
App. 1947); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353, 260 N.Y. Supp. 171 (app.) 
(1932). Contra, Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269, 151 A.L.R. 1217 (1944); 
Annot. 43 A.L.R.2d 1128 (1955).
71 U.S. Const, amend. V. Since juvenile proceedings are said to be civil, the Govern­
ment may appeal an adverse decision. 56 Stat. 195 (1942), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-772(a) 
(1951); cf. In re McDonald, 153 A.2d 651 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1959). Contra, United 
States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958), rev’d on other grounds, 106 App. D.C. 
221, 271 F.2d 487 (1959).
72 U.S. Const, amend. VIII; cf. In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P,2d 362 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Ex parte Espinosa, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576 (1945). Contra, 
Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. I960), appeal docketed,. No. 16037, D.C. 
Cir., Oct. 18, 1960; Annot. 160 AJL.R. 287 (1945).
73 U.S. Const, amend. VI; cf. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954); Annot.
43 AX.R.2d 1128 (1955).
74 palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
75 98 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 236 F.2d 666, 60 A.L.R.2d 686 (1956).
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than criminal forced the court to interpret the statute broadly. Since 
the statute grants the juvenile offender other rights which he could not 
intelligently exercise without the effective aid of counsel, it was reasoned 
that Congress must have intended that the juvenile offender should have 
the right to counsel as well.78 Furthermore, since any waiver of this 
right must be an intelligent one, it would seem that merely showing the 
defendant was informed of and understood that he had the right to 
counsel is not sufficient.77
Since the Shioutakon case established only a statutory right to counsel, 
it followed that the right’s retroactive application would not be granted. 
Swann v. D istrict of Columbia76 illustrated this problem in a habeas 
corpus proceeding. Petitioner, a fifteen-year-old boy at the time of his 
trial, was accused and convicted of “mugging” and committed to the 
National Training School for Boys. Swann contended that as he had 
not been advised of his right to counsel and did not have counsel during 
the proceedings, due process had been denied. The court reaffirmed the 
SMoutakon position that juveniles in delinquency proceedings are not 
entitled to counsel as a matter of constitutional right, not even as a matter 
of due process. Swann had been tried before the court of appeals in the 
Shioutakon case found the right to counsel within the statute, and retro­
active application of the statute was therefore denied.
The conceptual basis of these decisions—that juvenile proceedings 
are civil in nature—is still subject to the valid criticism leveled by a 
pr^-Shioutakon case in the district court. In In re Poff,™ where the 
right to counsel in juvenile proceedings was founded on due process, the 
court stated:
[B ]y some sort of rationalization, under the guise of protective measures, we 
have readied a point where rights once held by a juvenile are no longer his. 
Have we now progressed to a point where a child may be incarcerated and de­
prived of his liberty during his minority by calling that which is a crime by some 
other name? If so, at what age is the Congress limited to legislate on behalf of 
the juvenile? May a child be deprived of his liberty and incarcerated in an 
institution until he reaches the age of twenty-one years merely by changing the 
name of the offense from unauthorized use of a motor vehicle to juvenile de­
76 Id. at 374, 236 F.2d at 669. However, the right to counsel does not apply in parental- 
neglect proceedings. See In re Custody of Minor, 102 TJ.S. App. D.C. 94, 250 F.2d 419 (1957).
77 Williams v. Huff, 79 U.S. App. D.C. 31, 142 F.2d 91 (1944). (The district court pro­
ceeding was against a juvenile for assault with a dangerous weapon.)
78 152 A.2d 200 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1959). See Matter of Schaeffer, 126 A.2d 870 
(Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1956).
79 135 F. Supp. 224 (DJD.C. 1955).
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linquency? In other words, has the Congress wiped out the constitutional pro­
tection by changing a name, the substance remaining the same? This court stands 
steadfast in the belief that the Federal Constitution, insofar as it is applicable, 
“cannot be nullified by a mere nomenclature, the evil of the thing remaining the 
same.”80
Nevertheless, the law today in the District of Columbia is that a 
juvenile is entitled to effective counsel by the statute but not by virtue 
of the sixth amendment or the fifth-amendment due process clause. 
Consequently if Congress chooses, it may expressly abrogate the juvenile’s 
right.
To anyone familiar with the Juvenile Court Act, a courtroom barren 
of the public will come as no surprise. The act provides: “In the hearing 
of any case, the general public shall be excluded and only such persons 
as have a direct interest in the case and their representatives . . . 
admitted.”81 In practice, however, the present judge of the Juvenile 
Court conducts both hearings and trials in substantial conformity with 
the right of a public trial. Persons having a legitimate interest in the case 
are admitted, curiosity seekers excluded. Attorneys, law students; persons 
engaged in juvenile work, the press, and others who fall into similar 
categories are welcomed to the court, if they agree to keep juvenile identi­
ties secret. However, in the absence of any constitutional right and in 
the presence of a narrow statutory right to a semipublic trial, the pos­
sibility still exists that the legitimately interested public might just 
as freely be excluded. In view of the latent dangers of secret trials,82 it 
is submitted that the right to a public trial should be acknowledged as 
constitutionally guaranteed, yet in a manner that need not impair the 
protective philosophy of the act. Since the right belongs to the person 
being tried, it could be recognized, with provision made for waiver in 
the absence of a timely demand. Such recognition would yield protection 
to a basic right of the child while giving effect to at least one obvious 
purpose of the act—the safeguarding of juveniles from the notoriety at­
tending public trial and commitment.
The jury box is normally vacant, in this instance owing again to the 
clear language of the act: “The court shall hear and determine all cases 
of children without a jury unless a jury be demanded by the child, his
80 Id. at 226.
81 66 Stat. 134 (1952), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-915 (Supp. VIII, 1960), amending 52 Stat. 
599 (1938).
82 See generally Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
61-63 (1951). .
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parent, or guardian or the court.”83 Several reasons may be attributed to 
the large number of cases (82.7% in fiscal 1959)84 in which a jury is 
waived. First, waiver results if a demand is not made within five days 
after the initial hearing or arraignment before the judge.85 If the parents 
and child waive the right to counsel, they generally remain unapprised 
of the right to a jury, since they are usually not informed of it by the 
court. Even where the parties know a jury may be obtained, the right 
would be little enjoyed without counsel since a juvenile cannot be 
expected to pursue his case before a jury without legal assistance. 
Even with counsel, discretion would still appear to dictate waiver, for 
with the relaxed rules of evidence employed in juvenile trials, the harm 
to be feared from a jury’s inability to sift reliable from unreliable evi­
dence would probably surpass the risks involved when the judge alone 
acts as the finder of fact. A third factor which can influence the decision 
to waive is the prolongation of detention in the Receiving Home, since 
jury trials are held but once a month for juveniles. Thus the statutory 
“grant” of a right to jury trial appears to be somewhat shallow. Two 
curative methods may be suggested: first, inform the parties at the 
Director’s conference, or sooner, of the availability of a jury; secondly, 
require express waiver rather than the waiver by inaction currently 
prevailing.86
In lieu of any necessity for a grand jury indictment, a delinquency 
proceeding is held on the previously mentioned petition.87 The petition 
is drafted in the office of the Director of Social Service and almost 
automatically found legally sufficient by an assistant corporation coun­
sel.88 Thus, sufficient cause for formal judicial proceedings against the 
child is found by an administrative officer, not by presentment before a 
grand jury. The civil character of the proceedings again justifies this
83 52 Stat. 599 (1938), as amended, 66 Stat. 134 (1952), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-915 
(Supp. Vin, 1960).
84 D.C. Juv, Ct, Ann. Statistical Rep., Table 21 (1959).
85 D.C. Juv. Ct. R. 12(A), (B) (rev. Nov. 1, 1960).
86 See generally Heller, op. cit. supra note 82, at 1-34.
8T “Petition: A pleading, based on a complaint . . . alleging that a respondent is within 
the Court’s jurisdiction.” D.C. Juv. Ct. R., Definition 10 (rev. Nov. 1, 1960).
88 52 Stat. 597 (1938), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-908 (1951). See Hearings on S. 1456
Before the Committee on the District of Columbia, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1959). “Some 
time we talk to the police officer making the arrest if the information on the sheet itself 
is not sufficient. Nine out of ten times the statement of the police officer is sufficient to 
make out the prima fade case or not.” (Statement of an assistant corporation counsel for 
the District of Columbia).
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absence of a normal criminal procedure.89 But the confusion of what 
should be done after the child is adjudged delinquent with how he is to 
be so judged seems questionable. Fairness does not require the insertion 
of grand jury proceedings into the Juvenile Court system, but in view of 
the long periods of detention, together with the absence of conventional 
procedures for the determination of sufficient cause, additional procedural 
safeguards may be reasonably suggested.
The atmosphere at trial is one of dignified informality, as provided 
for by the statute.90 But it is here that the increase of juvenile delinquency 
with its resulting burden upon the court and its agencies becomes 
tragically apparent. Because of the long delay before the juvenile is 
tried, Corporation Counsel representatives, who originally had little time 
to familiarize themselves with the case, are even less familiar with it 
by the time it is presented for trial. If the witnesses can be found and 
are still living in the District, they tend to forget events with the passage 
of time. Perhaps even more important from the psychological viewpoint, 
the child is often forgetful of the events which have led him to court, 
thereby severely hampering any curative effect a court appearance or 
commitment may have upon him. The clog of cases in Juvenile Court 
continues to accumulate, aggravating an already difficult situation. As of 
June 30, 1959, there was a backlog of 235 juvenile cases requiring 
judicial action and 511 cases involving adults.91 The backlog as of June 
30, 1960, stood at 502 juvenile cases and 1,165 adult.92 An unofficial 
source estimates that as of December 1, 1960, the total backlog is “about 
2,000.” These figures go far in explaining the overcrowding and length 
of stay at the Receiving Home,83 the brevity of court hearings, the 
disappearance of witnesses, the forgetfulness of witnesses who do appear, 
the dismissal of cases for lack of evidence, the necessity for extra-judicial 
and extra-legal police and administrative measures to mitigate the 
onslaught., and the frustration of the individualized form of attention 
sought under the act. Undue delay, in itself, may cultivate a delinquent 
disposition in that it breeds disrespect for the law, if not outright antip­
athy toward it.
so E.g., Ex parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123 (S.D. Ohio 1911).
9° 52 Stat. 599 (1938), as amended, 66 Stat. 134 (1952), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-915 (Supp. 
VIII, 1960). "
91 D.C. Juv. Ct. Ann. Statistical Rep., Table 10 (1960).
02 ibid. ,
-03 See Receiving Home Population as of October 7, 8 and 9, 1960 (daily statistical 
report sent to Juvenile Court by Home officials). A sampling of the more aggravated cases 
reveals incarcerations of 87, 68, 56, 50, 40 and 37 days.
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The speed with which the one judge in Juvenile Court must handle 
each case, together with the duty of supervising the administrative 
facilities of the entire court, leads to further informality in the court­
room. While the petition is being read by the clerk, the judge is often 
compelled by his limited time to consult with another official of the 
court in order to dispose of paper work or orders relating to other 
cases.94 Corporation counsel presents his evidence, usually having the 
witnesses state what happened in narrative form. Opposing counsel has 
the right to cross-examine, but more often than not it is the judge who 
asks the pointed questions, seeking to uncover essential facts buried by 
the lapse of time between offense and trial. On the rare occasions when 
a police officer appears on the stand, it is normally not the arresting 
officer but a member of the Juvenile Squad, who relates what the 
arresting officer told him, together with other relevant information he 
may have seen or heard.
The juvenile frequently takes the stand although it does not appear 
that he could be required to testify if it were not his wish. While numer­
ous foreign jurisdictions have denied juveniles the fifth amendment pro­
tection against self-incrimination,95 no decision has yet issued on the point 
in the District of Columbia. As noted earlier, the Mallory rule,96 forbid­
ding the use of statements made during an illegal detention, is not applic­
able in Juvenile Court.07 Hearsay evidence is admissible, but the social 
worker is not permitted to read the report containing privileged material 
either before or during the determination of the juvenile’s delinquent 
status.98 In practice, the rules of evidence seem to be solely within the 
discretion of the judge. Perhaps the best description of the evidentiary
04 An average of eight to twelve minutes only can be devoted to each case or hearing. 
This figure is drawn from time spent on all the diverse proceedings before the court, and 
is low partially because of the large number of guilty pleas entered. Hearings on S. 1456 
Before the House Committee on the District of Columbia, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1959) 
(Statement of Judge Orman Ketcham, Judge of the Juvenile Court for the District of 
Columbia). See also Hearings on S. 1456, at 85. Testimony of Mrs. Quenstedt, Assistant 
Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, in reference to Judge Ketcham’s 
predecessor: “I have seen 86 new cases involving children go through in one day, and I 
know it has been a terrific grind for one judge to handle the large number of cases in 
that court.”
05 E.g., In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 
171, 183 N.E. 353, 260 N.Y. Supp. 171 (app.) (1932).
86 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
07 Pee v. United States, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 47, 52, 274 F.2d 556, 560 (1959).
88 in re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1953).
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rules used in Juvenile Court is that they “follow the rules of evidence 
which apply in administrative law cases to a greater extent than in 
criminal cases.”09 As might be expected, current practice in the Juvenile 
Court is to adhere less strictly to the rules of evidence where trial is had 
without jury. Moreover, the court will carefully examine self-incriminat­
ing statements made by the child for assurance that they are voluntary, 
although no constitutional or statutory provision compels such inquiry.100
After the evidence is in and final argument or statement made, the 
judge instructs the jury and a verdict will be returned; in the absence of 
a jury, the judge will make his own decision. In the latter case, no 
specific findings of fact are made—either the child committed the offense 
or he did not. In most cases, this decision is reached by the judge 
without leaving the bench and within a few moments. If a determination 
of delinquency is reached, the social worker, with his report and opinion, 
comes before the court.
The social worker’s report normally includes the background of the 
child, e.g., family, surroundings, previous difficulties, the progress of 
the child over the period of consultation, and a recommendation as to 
his future treatment. On the basis of this report and recommendation, the 
offense involved, previous record, and any other relevant material before 
the court, the judge determines what disposition is to be made. Except in 
the most unusual type of case, the decision is reached within a few 
moments. Although the decision is often difficult and clearly of great, 
importance to the child’s future, the throng of people in the hall outside 
the courtroom waiting their turn before the court does not permit the 
judge the luxury of prolonged meditation.
Many avenues are opened to the judge in making this disposition. 
The child may be placed on probation, committed to the Department of 
Public Welfare, or returned to the custody of his parents, relatives or 
other fit person. If the child appears to need mental or physical care, the 
judge may have him committed to the D.C. General Hospital for treat­
ment or a determination that the child should be committed to a mental
99 Hearings on. S. 1456 Before the House Committee on the District of Columbia, 86th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1959) (statement of an assistant corporation counsel for the District 
of Columbia).
100 The elimination of the fifth amendment right from juvenile proceedings and the 
Juvenile Court’s refusal to give it even token application in other jurisdictions has 
elicited dissents of great eloquence. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 179, 183 N.E. 353, 
356, 260 N.Y. Supp. 171, 179 (app.) (1932) (Crane, J., dissenting); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 
599, 610, 109 A.2d 523, 528 (1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
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institution. The latter determination may indirectly result in confine­
ment in such an institution for an indefinite period of time. If neither 
hospital nor mental institution appear desirable or necessary, the child 
may be placed in a qualified private agency or institution at no public 
expense, sent to the Children’s Center in Laurel, Maryland, or to the 
National Training School for Boys. The Juvenile Court judge also has 
the power to send the child temporarily to the D.C. Jail101 where re­
habilitative prospects seem, at the very least, doubtful. Finally, the 
judge may make “such further disposition of the child as may be pro­
vided by law and as the court may deem to be best for the best interests 
of the child.”102 This provision of the Juvenile Court Act was probably 
intended to embrace those ad hoc situations requiring a remedy tailor- 
made to the child’s difficulty.
In general then, the juvenile in court faces a paternalistic type trial. 
However, the introduction of sociological concepts into courtroom pro­
cedure has created a danger that invites the imposition of legal safe­
guards. The presence of such concepts should not replace the rules of 
procedure and evidence which have been established to insure accuracy 
and fairness in the courtroom, but rather should complement them. 
Here, more than anywhere else in the processing of juveniles, a need 
appears for the practical integration of essential safeguards to insure an 
accurate finding that the accused juvenile has committed the offense. 
The urgency of this need becomes more apparent in view of the follow­
ing section of this note.
VI
T h e  T r a n s f e r  Ca se s
As indicated, this note does not purport to review juvenile procedure 
and treatment beyond the dispositive stage at which the judge determines 
a course of probation or commitment for a child offender. But one aspect 
of the post-disposition procedure merits attention since it threatens 
to destroy the very fabric of, and justification for, an informal juvenile 
system.
In 1941 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that 
the Attorney General’s statutory power to transfer prisoners from one 
federal prison to another did not extend to the transfer to such prisons 
of juveniles committed to the National Training School for Boys, since 
exclusive jurisdiction and control over such juveniles was legislatively
101 52 Stat. 602 (1938), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-927 (1951).
102 52 Stat. 600 (1938), D.C. Code Ann. § 11-915(3) (1951).
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vested  in  the Juven ile  C ourt.103 C hronically bad  conduct on the part of 
th e  ju ven ile  petitioner in  the case, w hile h e  w as an inm ate a t the N a ­
tional T raining School, had  triggered h is transfer to  the L orton  R eform a­
tory. H is  w rit o f habeas corpus w as sustained  in the d istrict court and  
affirmed on appeal.104 Shortly  thereafter, C ongress responded to  the  
decision  b y  am ending the sta tu tory  grant o f  pow er to  th e  A ttorney Gen­
eral to include specifica lly  w ithin  it  th e  pow er to  transfer inm ates o f th e  
N ation a l T raining School,105 and th is am endm ent continues on the  
b ooks.106 A n estim ated  100 inm ates o f the School h ave been transferred  
to  adu lt federal reform atories a t C hillicothe, Petersburg, D anb u ry  and  
sim ilar institu tions since the am endm ent reversed the determ ination o f  
the court o f appeals.107
F ew  decisions have appeared over th is period to  review  the propriety  
o f th ese  transfers. Shortly  after the am endm ent, i t  w as held  th a t th e  
additional grant of pow er b y  C ongress h ad  in ferentia lly  repealed the  
section  o f the D istr ic t o f C olum bia Code w hich  subjects a  juvenile  
com m itted  to  th e  N ation a l T raining School to  the exclusive jurisdiction  
o f th e  Juven ile  C ourt.108 T h en , in  1954, the D istr ic t Court for the  
D istr ic t o f C olum bia interpreted the am endm ent as having granted to  
th e A ttorney General pow er to  designate p laces o f confinem ent “lim ited  
to  those w here special facilities are provided for train ing and care, som e­
w hat com parable to those provided b y  the N ation a l T rain ing School 
for B oys, but w ith  closer supervision  w here necessary for those th at m ay  
prove to  b e otherw ise in tractable.”109 A ssum ing th a t the juven ile in  the  
case, w ho w as then tem porarily lodged  in  the D .C . Jail, w ould  be speedily  
sen t to  such a  su itab le p lace o f detention  other than the N ation a l T rain­
ing  School, th e  court discharged th e ju ven ile’s w rit o f habeas^ corpus 
w ithout prejudice to  renew al.110 T h e  w rit w as renew ed w hen th e b oy  
w as transferred b y  the A ttorn ey  G eneral to  the F ederal Correctional 
In stitu tion  a t A shland, K entucky , and the sam e court th is tim e sustained  
th e w rit, on the ground th a t th e K en tu ck y  institution  w as “designed for the
103 Huff v. Bryant, 74 App. D.C. 19, 121 F.2d 890 (1941).
l°* Id. at 21, 121 F.2d at 892.
105 18 U.S.C. § 753(f) (Supp. I, 1940).
106 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1958).
10T Hearings on S. 1456 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the 
District of Columbia, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1959).
108 Riley v. Pescor, 63 F. Supp. 1 (WD. Mo. 1945).
109 white v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954).
n o  Id. at 651.
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cu stody  o f persons convicted  o f  crim e” and w ould  therefore in volve a  
prohibited  com m ingling of juven iles w ith  crim inals.111
D esp ite  th e  interpretation  p laced  on the A ttorn ey  G eneral’s pow er b y  
these decisions, a  different judge sittin g  five years later h eld  th a t the  
D irector o f Prisons o f the U n ited  S tates is  authorized b y  law 112 to  
transfer inm ates o f the N atio n a l T raining School to  an y  federal institu ­
tion, w hether a  p lace o f incarceration  for adu lt crim inals or not.113 T h e  
in stitu tion  involved  in  th is instance w as th e Federal R eform atory of 
C hillicothe, Ohio. B u t another 1959 decision  o f the d istrict court disagreed  
w ith  th is result, hold ing th at the federal statute relating to the pow ers o f  
the A ttorn ey  G eneral does n ot app ly  to  juveniles com m itted  under th e  
D istr ic t o f C olum bia Code provision  since “no adjudication upon the  
status o f an y  child  shall be deem ed conviction  o f a  crim e.”114
T h en  in A pril o f 1960, on the ground th at ja il w as an im proper p lace  
for a  child, d istrict court Judge Y oungdahl sustained  a  w rit o f habeas 
corpus filed  b y  a  juvenile petitioner w ho w as in  the D .C . Jail, under the  
A ttorn ey  G eneral’s power, pending a  determ ination o f  w hether h is  
N ation a l T rain ing  School parole should  be revoked.115 In  agreem ent 
w ith  the earlier d istrict court decision o f 1954,116 Judge Y oungdahl 
construed the am endm ent as n ot authorizing th e  detention  o f a N ation a l 
T rain ing School parolee a t  a n y  in stitu tion , but on ly  a t  the N ation a l 
T rain ing School or another institu tion  w ith  su bstan tia lly  sim ilar facilities. 
T h e  decision noted  th at a “grave constitu tional question” w ould  attend  
a  literal application  o f the am endm ent,117 and  pointed  out th at the  
relaxation o f constitu tional safeguards in  juven ile  proceedings can on ly  
b e justified  if  the proceedings are absolu tely  noncrim inal.
T h e k eyn ote  is  struck  b y  th is  observation. C learly an  inform al 
“civ il,” “ rehabilitative” process o f arrest, trial and confinem ent to ta lly  
breaks down under the w eigh t o f its  own h ypocrisy  if  its  end  resu lt is  
th e  incarceration o f a  you th  in  an  adu lt crim inal reform atory. T h is  con­
clusion is  unavoidable, barring a redefinition o f benevolence and “guard­
ianship im posed b y  the sta te as p a re n s  p a t r i a e ” 118 Perhaps the m ost
m  White v. Reid, 126 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.D.C. 1954).
H2 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1958).
i 13 Clay v. Reid, 173 F. Supp. 667 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, 106 U.S. App. D.C. 
298, 272 F.2d 527 (1959).
H4 Cogdell v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 102 (D.D.C. 1959).
l l “ Kautter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960).
lie  White v. Reid, 126 F. Supp. 867 (DJD.C. 1954).
H7 183 F. Supp. at 354.
u s White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647, 649 (DJ3.C. 1954).
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penetrating lega l statem ent y e t  m ade in  this regard w as u ttered  b y  th e  
la te  Judge B o lith a  L aw s:
To send a juvenile to the usual penitentiary where hardened criminals are 
kept in close confinement and under special types of strict discipline, where the 
juvenile would inevitably come into contact with them and suffer the same type 
of treatment as they do, would in effect stamp the case of the juvenile as a 
criminal case except insofar as his records would be protected from public dis­
closure. In stick criminal prosecutions, constitutional safeguards must be vouch­
safed the accused.119
T his v iew  is  unofficially favored am ong Juven ile C ourt personnel. In  
an inform al effort to  circum vent further transfers from  th e  N ation a l 
T rain ing School to  adult prisons, Juven ile Court Judge Orman K etcham  
early  in 1960 reached an agreem ent w ith  the B ureau  o f Prisons w hereby  
his sentences to  the School w ere not to  exceed  18 m onths or to  extend  
through th e  ju ven ile’s  18th birthday, w hichever involved  th e  longer  
tim e.120 T he purpose o f such  lim itation  w as to  attenuate the overcrow ded  
conditions th a t p lagued  B ureau officials in  their m anagem ent o f  the  
school. In  return, the B ureau, an agen cy  subordinate to  th e  A ttorney  
G eneral, gave assurance th at the transfer o f  inm ates to  adu lt reform ator­
ie s  w ould  n o t tak e p lace w ithout th e consent o f Judge K etcham . B u t no  
legal force attaches to  the agreem ent; thus w hile th e sentences have been  
lim ited  to  the stipu lated  periods, th e  B ureau h as continued th e practice o f  
transfer w ith  on ly  m inim al consultation w ith  the judge.
A ppellate confirm ation o f the recent d istrict court v iew s lim iting  th e  
A ttorn ey  G eneral’s power o f transfer is  thus to  be strongly  desired. Or, 
in  th e alternative, a system  already susp ic iously  close to  a  crim inal 
process should  be open ly  declared as such  and the p resen tly  om itted  
constitu tional protections should  be afforded those subjected to  its  grip. 
A s m atters stand , th e  ends, transfers to  federal prisons, and th e m eans, 
the relaxed and unguarded treatm ent o f juven iles, are in  theory  m utually  
exclusive, b u t in  practice g laringly  coexistent.
Co n c l u sio n
T h e single m ost strik ing factor one encounters in  th is hope-generated  
juven ile  system  is  th e d issatisfaction  w ith  it  expressed b y  every  person  
officially involved . T h is  reaction  on th e one hand proves th a t the system  
does not function  su ccessfu lly , y e t  on the other i t  reveals th a t the m en  
and w om en involved  dearly w ish  the situation  w ere different. T h e  la ck  
of indifference is  d issatisfaction ’s h ea lth y  aspect. B u t the cold  facts are
119 Id. at 650-51. (Emphasis added.)
120 See Statement of Procedures Regarding Commitments by the Juvenile Court of 
the District of Columbia to the National Training School for Boys, June 10, I960.
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th a t th e  po lice feel ham pered, and are aw are o f the questionable pro­
p riety  o f som e o f their procedures, desp ite th e undeniable concern th ey  
bring to  the job; that the judicial personnel is  n o t ab le to  w ork the  
fifteen-hour d ay  requisite to  a n y  tru ly  adequate a ttention  to  the cases;  
th a t the Social Service personnel labor in the classic situation  o f lim ited  
m en facing unlim ited  difficulties, speak ing on ly  num erically. T h ese  are the  
few  problem s w hich th is n ecessarily  abbreviated  stu d y  has encountered; 
m any m ore doubtless ex ist beneath  th e philosophical facade ju stify in g  
th e practices and proceedings regarding D istr ic t juven iles. T o  unearth  
these problem s, as w ell a s to  cope w ith  those delineated  in  th is article, is  
a  project aw aiting the illum ination o f  a  civic-com m ittee inquiry.
Such a  stu d y  m ay w ell consider a  practical integration  o f th e  B ill o f  
R igh ts guarantees relating to  crim inal proceedings w ith  th e basic ph il­
osophy o f the Juven ile A ct. T ailoring conventional constitu tional sa fe­
guards to  im plem ent the act w ould  serve to  circum vent questionable  
adm inistrative and  judicial procedures developing as a  consequence o f 
an overw helm ing case load. A dditionally , the D istr ic t’s appellate courts, 
although th ey  have show n an adm irably expressed in terest in  juven ile  
processes in  recent years, m ay  be w ell advised  to  base their appraisals o f  
these processes less on the theory  o f the Juven ile  C ourt A ct than  on the  
practices o f th e authorities operating under or in conjunction w ith  it.
F in a lly , the C ongress o f the U nited  S tates m ust bring a m ore expansive  
p oin t o f v iew  to th e  threatening lack  o f m anpower now  availab le for 
Juven ile  C ourt judicial and adm inistrative socia l w ork. S ince 1906 w hen  
the court w as established , on ly  one judicial position  has been deem ed  
n ecessary  for the adequate discharge o f juven ile  casew ork, desp ite a  
population grow th over th e years o f from 300 ,000  to  880 ,000  in th e  c ity , 
350 ,000  to 2 ,100 ,000  in  th e m etropolitan  area, and an increase in  judge­
ships from  7 to  16 in  th e M unicipal C ourt, from  5 to  15 in  th e U nited  
States d istrict court, and  from  3 to  9 in the U n ited  S tates court o f  
appeals, and th e estab lishm ent o f  a  three-m an M unicipal C ourt o f  
A ppeals. T h e  num ber o f D .C . residents below  th e age o f  18 alone is 
tod ay  estim ated  a t  250 ,000 . In  the v iew  o f som e legislators a  juvenile  
court should perhaps perform  w ith  the m achined log ic  o f a  chiclet 
dispenser, b u t other inform ed sources believe not unjustifiably  th at  
im plem entation  o f th e  system ’s p h ilosophy should  be conditioned not 
b y  w hether one judge can equal the w orld m ark for the num ber of 
cases handled in  a  year, b u t b y  som e m inim al in terest in  child  w elfare.
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